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An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection
favors individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the
cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment
of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analyzed as public goods shaped by
kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have
received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favors selfish individuals
to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess
resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the
public good. Thus, purely selfish behavior causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that
contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to
the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then
the pressure favoring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly
on the public good, then the pressure favoring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way,
it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods
problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests
for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public
goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology
and socialitya.
INTRODUCTION
Many biological problems turn on the dilemma of pub-
lic goods. For example, a microbe may secrete an enzyme
to digest an extracellular resource into a form that can
be taken up by the cell. The cost of such secretions is
borne by the individual cell that produces the enzyme.
The benefit of the secreted enzyme is, by contrast, pub-
licly available to any neighboring cell that can take up
the digested resource. The public goods dilemma arises
because those nonsecreting cells that do not produce en-
zymes gain the same benefit as secretors, but the nonse-
cretors do not pay the cost of secretion. In direct com-
petition, nonsecretors outcompete secretors. Enzyme se-
cretion, as a public good, declines in frequency.
The public goods dilemma applies to any character
that is directly costly to the individual and advantageous
for all members of the local group. Characters that re-
duce individual competitiveness or rate of resource ac-
quisition in a way that enhances group efficiency or pro-
ductivity face the dilemma. Examples include the trade-
off between rate and yield in metabolism [1], aspects of
parasite virulence [2], sex ratio in local groups in which
productivity depends on the number of reproductive fe-
males [3], and contributions to repressing or punishing
group members that behave selfishly [4]. This tension
between individual and group success is universal at all
levels of biological organization [5]. A later section of this
paper provides more detailed citations connecting pub-
lic goods problems to studies in biology and the social
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In prior evolutionary models, I formulated the public
goods dilemma in terms of the tragedy of the commons
[6–9]. In this paper, I emphasize three key aspects of
public goods problems that have not been developed in
a general way.
First, how do startup costs for production of a public
good influence the amount produced. How do alternative
opportunities for success in the absence of a public good
influence the scaling of benefits? For example, to make
a secreted enzyme, a bacterial cell must often turn on
a complex pathway that requires enhanced expression of
several components. This startup cost means that pro-
duction of very low levels of the public good is likely be
significantly costly, whereas increasing production from
low levels may not add much expense. With regard to
benefits, a public good that is essential for survival faces
different pressures from a public good that only incre-
mentally enhances success. Such scaling issues often do
not receive the attention they deserve, even though scal-
ing may explain much of the variation in observed con-
tributions to public goods.
Second, how do nonlinearities in costs and benefits af-
fect production? On the cost side, increasing production
of a public good may require rising energy per unit pro-
duction to drive the production at a faster rate. On the
benefit side, an excess of the secretion may cause satura-
tion and diminishing benefits.
Third, how does variation in resource level or vigor in-
fluence individual contribution to public goods? In three
prior studies, I found that those individuals with greater
than average resource contributed more to public goods,
whereas those with less than average resource reduced
their contribution [10–12]. Individuals rapidly stratified
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2into an upper class that contributed greatly to public
benefit and social cohesion and a lower class that con-
tributed little to the public good. However, those three
studies were framed with regard to particular characters
and particular assumptions. Here, I analyze the prob-
lem of variable resources in a general way, to study the
common processes that shape public goods dilemmas.
PUBLIC GOODS WITHOUT INDIVIDUAL
VARIATION
I start with the case in which individual resources do
not vary. This case introduces the way in which natural
selection shapes characters in public goods situations.
I use the standard group-structured assumptions for
biological models of social processes [9]. The population
is divided into a large number of local groups. Interac-
tions between individual competitiveness and group effi-
ciency happen within local groups. An individual’s direct
loss in competitiveness from contribution to public goods
may be offset by its gain from the public goods contribu-
tions of its neighbors.
To start, we need an expression for individual fitness,
w, that captures individual costliness, c, and group ben-
efit, b, which we write as
w =
[
1− c(y)
1− c(z∗)
]
b(z)
b(z∗)
. (1)
Individual production of the public good, y, reduces the
direct individual component of fitness by the cost c(y)
when holding constant the group beneficial effect, b. We
normalize the individual fitness component by 1−c(z∗) to
get a meaningful scale for costs, where z∗ is the average
of y across all groups in the population. The average of
individual contributions to public goods within a group
is z; the group’s public goods benefit individual fitness by
the group efficiency term, b(z). We normalize the benefit
by the population average value, b(z∗).
We search for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
y = z = z∗ such that, when that allocation to public
goods is adopted by all members of the population, no
individual can do better by deviating by a small amount
from the ESS [13]. Individual values, y, may be corre-
lated with local group averages, z. Such correlations may
be caused by genetical kinship, by choice of group part-
ners, or by any other process that correlates individual
and group characters. To allow for such correlations, we
apply the generalized ESS methods for kin selection or
correlated interactions [9, 14].
In the general method, we search for a local maximum
of the expected value of fitness for a given individual
character, E(w|y), with respect to small deviations in
the individual character y. The derivative of fitness with
respect to deviations in individual character value is
d E(w|y)
dy
= wy + rwz = −Cm + rBm, (2)
where wy and wz are the partial derivatives of fitness
relative to y and z, respectively, and r = dz/dy is
the slope (regression) of group character on individual
character—the measure of correlation between individ-
ual and group behavior [7, 9, 14]. The terms Cm and Bm
denote marginal costs and benefits, which allow us to see
the relation to the marginal form of Hamilton’s rule from
the theory of social evolution [9, 14], although one must
be careful when considering the meaning of Hamilton’s
theory of kin selection and inclusive fitness relative to
the general expression of marginal costs and benefits in
correlated group structures given here [9, 15, 16].
When we apply the marginal value rule in Eq. (2) to
the fitness expression in Eq. (1), set the derivative to
zero, and solve for the ESS, we obtain
r
b′
b
=
c′
1− c , (3)
where all functions are evaluated at the ESS, y = z =
z∗, and the primes denote derivatives. Thus, the ESS
satisfies the social rule that the marginal benefits of the
group, b′/b, weighted by the regression of the group on
the individual, r, must equal the marginal cost, c′/(1−c).
If we assume linear costs, c(y) = y, and linear benefits,
b(z) = z, then we obtain the ESS
z∗ =
r
1 + r
.
The value of r is the regression of group value on indi-
vidual value. In groups of size N , the individual value
is a fraction 1/N of the group value. Thus, we can
write r = 1/N + rˆ, where 1/N arises from the perfect
correlation of an individual to itself as a fraction 1/N
of the group [17–22], and rˆ is the correlation between
pairs of different individuals in a group [9, 11]. If the
only correlation arises from an individual to itself, then
z∗ = 1/(N + 1).
Startup costs and fixed benefits
To make a secreted enzyme, a bacterial cell must often
turn on a complex pathway that requires enhanced ex-
pression of several components. This startup cost means
that production of very low levels of the public good is
likely be significantly costly, whereas increasing produc-
tion from low levels may not add much expense. We can
incorporate a startup cost by assuming c(y) = k + y for
y > 0 and c(0) = 0, where the cost of turning on the
pathway is k.
On the benefit side, it may often be more realistic to
assume some productivity in the absence of the public
good. In particular, we may write the benefit as b(z) =
s + z, so that there is a fixed productivity of s in the
absence of the public good. Using these more general
assumptions, we obtain the ESS contribution to public
goods as
z∗ =
r(1− k)− s
1 + r
. (4)
3If s > r(1−k), then the ESS is no contribution to public
goods, z∗ = 0. Thus, low correlation (r) or high baseline
fitness (s) favors withholding of public goods, consistent
with the general notion that competitive situations often
disfavor contribution to public goods.
Nonlinearity
On the benefit side, an excess of a public good may
cause saturation and diminishing benefits. On the cost
side, increasing production of a public good requires ad-
ditional raw materials and may also require rising energy
per unit production to drive the production at a faster
rate. Other nonlinearities may arise. To capture po-
tential nonlinearities in a simple way, let c(y) = k + yβ
and b(z) = s + zα. With these assumptions, we can use
Eq. (3) to obtain the ESS condition
zβ(β + rα) + zβ−αsβ − rα(1− k) = 0.
If α = β, then
z∗ =
[
r(1− k)− s
1 + r
]1/α
.
Increasing α favors more allocation to public goods.
When α < 1, costs and benefits increase at a dimin-
ishing rate, and public goods allocation is less than with
linear costs and benefits, suggesting that the diminishing
benefits are weighted more heavily than the diminishing
costs. By contrast, when α > 1, costs and benefits in-
crease at an accelerating rate, and public goods allocation
is greater than with linear costs and benefits, suggesting
that the accelerating benefits are weighted more heavily
than the accelerating costs.
PUBLIC GOODS WITH INDIVIDUAL
VARIATION
Now suppose that individuals vary in their resource
level or vigor. Each group has the same fraction of indi-
viduals with resource level class, j, with resources 1 + δj
and contribution to public goods yj , leading to fitness as
wj =
[
1 + δj − c(yj)
1 + δj − c(z∗j )
]
b(z)
b(z∗)
, (5)
where z∗j is the set of ESS values for individual contribu-
tions given the resource level of each class, j. Applying
the marginal social rule of Eq. (2), we obtain for each j
the ESS condition
rj
b′
b
=
c′j
1 + δj − cj , (6)
where rj = dz/dyj , the function b is evaluated at the
ESS group average, z∗, and the function cj is evaluated
at the ESS for each class, z∗j . We can see directly from
this solution that, as the class correlation with the group
average rises, expressed by higher rj , the marginal ben-
efit is weighted more heavily, and thus that class will
be favored to change its allocation to public goods un-
til its marginal cost rises to match the increase in the
weighted marginal benefit. In most reasonable cases, a
rise in marginal cost means greater allocation to public
goods. Thus, typically a rise in rj implies greater contri-
bution to public goods.
Given that simple role for the correlation structure set
by rj , let us fix rj = r for all j. With a fixed correlation
structure, we can study how resource level affects contri-
bution to public goods independently of the correlational
structure.
If we assume linear costs, c(yj) = yj and linear benefits
b(z) = z, then we obtain the ESS
z∗j = 1 + δj −
z∗
r
,
which shows that the allocation of each class to public
goods, z∗j , changes directly with the class’s resource level,
δj . If we assume that the distribution of resource levels
in each group is symmetric about zero, and we assume
that z∗ is greater than the maximum value of δj , then we
obtain the simple expression
z∗j − z∗ = δj , (7)
where z∗ = r/(1 + r). This simple form for the general
public goods dilemma matches the solutions for particu-
lar public goods problems in earlier papers [11, 12].
At the ESS given by Eq. (7), the fitness of all classes
is the same independently of their resource level. We see
this by starting with a modified expression of fitness from
Eq. (5) without normalization, as wˆj = [1+δj−c(yj)]b(z).
Evaluating at the ESS, yj = z
∗
j and z = z
∗, we obtain
wˆj = (1 − z∗)z∗, which is the same for all classes and is
independent of the initial resource level.
Thus, in the public goods setting with linear costs and
benefits, those with extra resources give up their entire
excess for public benefit, and those with less resources
withhold contribution to bring their success up to match
those initially better endowed. Each individual, in pursu-
ing its own selfish interest, gives up its initial advantage
to produce a perfectly even distribution of payoffs.
Startup costs and fixed benefits
The main result in this section is that, for startup costs
and fixed benefits, and with variation in resource level,
we once again obtain z∗j − z∗ = δj , but in this case with
z∗ from Eq. (4). I give a few details.
Using c(y) = k+y and b(z) = s+z as before, we obtain
the condition that
z∗j = 1 + δj − k −
s+ z∗
r
4for all j, with the constraint that the combination of pa-
rameters must satisfy z∗j ≥ 0. Assuming z∗ + δj ≥ 0 for
all j, then for a symmetric distribution of resource devi-
ations, δj , centered at zero, we can use z
∗ from Eq. (4)
and obtain z∗j − z∗ = δj .
Nonlinearity
Suppose, as before, c(y) = k + yβ and b(z) = s + zα.
Then from Eq. (6), we obtain the ESS condition
rαzα−1
s+ zα
=
βzβ−1j
1 + δj − k − zβj
,
for all j, with the constraint that all z values must be
nonnegative. This equation by itself provides little in-
sight, but is easy to evaluate numerically for particular
assumptions about resource variation, startup costs, and
nonlinearities. For example, one could assume that costs
rise at an accelerating rate, β > 1, because of increased
energy required to drive the rate of production faster,
and benefits rise at a diminishing rate, α < 1, because
an increasing abundance of the beneficial public good can
saturate demand or efficient usage.
CONNECTIONS TO PRIOR WORK
The public goods dilemma arises in many biological,
social, and economic problems. This paper does not re-
view the extensive theoretical literature. However, a few
pointers to prior work may be helpful.
In biology, many problems of kin selection [23] or group
selection [17, 24] arise from the public goods dilemma.
Since the 1990s, emphasis in the evolutionary literature
on cooperation [7] and parasite virulence [8] have con-
nected the public goods dilemma to Hardin’s 1968 slo-
gan of “the tragedy of the commons,” following Leigh’s
1977 earlier commentary. Dionisio and Gordo [27] and
Rankin et al. [28] recently reviewed the tragedy of the
commons in biology. West et al. [29] review public goods
in microbes.
Nonlinearities in biology have been analyzed often.
Many of the early papers on sex allocation, tragedy of
the commons, and parasite virulence included nonlinear
costs and benefits. To cite one recent example, Foster [30]
presented a detailed analysis of the importance of non-
linearities in understanding the tragedy of the commons.
Startup costs of production were discussed extensively for
sex allocation [31, 32], but are not always emphasized in
public goods problems. Some models do include a scaling
for baseline success, such as West et al.’s 2002 study of
nitrogen fixation by rhizobia.
Variable resources have been developed most exten-
sively for problems of sex allocation [10, 31, 32, 34, 35],
but that work did not make a direct connection to the
general public goods dilemma. My work on variable re-
sources in repression of competition [11] and herd immu-
nity [12] was within a public goods context, but I did not
emphasize the generality of the solution and the connec-
tion to the earlier analyses of sex allocation. There must
be several other studies of variable resources related to
public goods problems. However, there is a tendency in
the biological literature to ignore variability even though
it is both widespread and important.
Public goods and the tragedy of the commons are dis-
cussed widely in the social sciences. Ostrom [36, 37, 38]
has contributed extensively to conceptual analysis and
empirical application. Economic theory has a highly de-
veloped literature on a variety of related topics, some
of which are described as public goods problems [39].
Those problems are typically framed in somewhat differ-
ent ways from the simple biologically motivated models
in this paper, but some economic work does turns on indi-
vidual versus group tension. Spatial population structure
is one key difference between the biological and social sci-
ence models: often, the social science models assume a
single population, and so do not include a correlation
between individual and group behavior. Without cor-
relation, r = 0, it is more difficult to achieve individ-
ual contribution to public goods. Boyd and Richerson’s
2002 work on cultural evolution in group structured pop-
ulations may provide an interesting connection between
problems in the biological and social sciences.
DISCUSSION
I emphasize two conclusions. First, variation in indi-
vidual resources favors selfish individuals to vary their
allocation to public goods. Those individuals better en-
dowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit,
whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute
less to the public good. In the simplest case, all individ-
uals end up with the same fitness in spite of initial varia-
tion in endowment. Thus, purely selfish behavior causes
individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute
greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower
classes that contribute little to the public good.
The role of variation may be tested experimentally in
microbes. One could manipulate resources by creating
variants with and without the ability to use different
sources of energy. By controlling the abundance of each
energy source, one could create different classes of indi-
viduals that have access to different levels of resource.
The theory here predicts that the microbes would evolve
a stratified pattern of contribution to public goods. Sim-
ilar behavioral tests in primates may also be possible.
However, the complexity of behavioral strategies may
make it difficult to sort among alternative hypotheses
for changes in behavior in response to manipulated or
natural variation in resource level.
The second conclusion concerns the group’s depen-
dence on the public good. If group success absolutely
5requires production of the public good, then the pres-
sure favoring production is relatively high. By contrast,
if group success depends weakly on the public good, then
the pressure favoring production is relatively weak. I ex-
pressed these dependencies by writing the benefit term
as b(z) = s + z, where s sets the level of group benefit
in the absence of the public good. Once stated in this
way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is im-
portant. However, discussions of public goods problems
sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently.
The role of baseline success may be tested by manipu-
lating the group’s dependence on production of a public
good. In experimental evolution studies of microbes, one
could measure the response of public goods productiv-
ity to changes in dependence measured by s. For ex-
ample, Ku¨mmerli et al. [41] experimentally manipulated
s by altering the amount of iron available to bacteria
and studying the evolutionary response of secreted iron-
scavenging public goods molecules. Their results support
the prediction that as baseline fitness rises with increas-
ing experimentally provided iron, bacteria reduce their
contribution to the costly public good. Observational
studies of microbes may be able to compare natural set-
tings in which dependence on a public good varies. Ex-
periments or observational studies in primates or other
animals would also be possible, but once again it may be
difficult to separate between alternative hypotheses with
regard to behavioral changes.
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